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From the narrow to the broad.  
Multiple perspectives on language evolution.
Abstract. Although many of the recent controversies in the field of language 
evolution research are empirical, the deepest divides seem to remain theoretical 
in nature. Specifically, defining language in incompatible ways has led to radically 
different views on language evolution as a programme, including evaluation of its 
current success and future progress. Despite recent manifestos from the “narrow” 
camp (Hauser et al. 2014; Bolhuis et al. 2014), who along the lines of Hauser, 
Chomsky and Fitch (2002) equates language with the syntactic processor, the rival 
approach seems to be gaining momentum. It embodies a move in exactly the opposite 
direction, by understanding language broadly and assuming an inclusive perspective 
on its origins, which results in ongoing expansion of the field of language evolution. 
New areas of academic reflection (such as normativity) are being brought to bear, new 
areas of linguistics are being included (such as pragmatics or linguistic politeness); 
and, interestingly, existing linguistic methods are now being used to inform animal 
communication studies.
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1. Introduction
Many of the recent controversies in the field of language evolution – 
the modern study of language origins – bear the hallmarks of empirical 
problems amenable to the methods of the Kuhnian normal science. This day-
to-day “puzzle solving” may not be able to give us any “big” answers in the 
near future, but it is yielding a wealth of evidence to evaluate the competing 
hypotheses and weigh them against each other in an informed way. Were 
the Neandertals able to speak? The debate continues, but converging evidence 
(e.g. Johansson 2012, Dediu and Levinson 2013) systematically favours that 
possibility. Was there a gestural rather than vocal protolanguage? Semiotic 
experiments such as those by Fay et al. (2013)1 combined with data from e.g. 
primate communication (e.g. Slocombe et al. 2011) provide good reasons 
to believe that the first language-like communicative system could indeed 
rely on a significant visual component.
Interestingly, however, some of the deepest controversies in language 
evolution are not due to the shortage of good evidence, but rather result 
directly from the foundational theoretical problems. “Your theory of language 
evolution depends on your theory of language”, the title of a chapter by Ray 
Jackendoff (2010), may also be the most accurate summary of the status 
quo in this field of research: the deepest divide lies in defining the central 
notion of interest. In “Discussing the evolution of the assorted beasts called 
language”, Rudolf Botha (2000) offers a useful point in case: reading through 
the volume resulting from the first Evolang conference, he lists thirteen 
different conceptualisations of language, from a “process” to a “skill”, to an 
“activity”, to a “contract”. If we wanted a unifying dimension for organising 
all this diversity and the resulting difference of opinion, probably the most 
useful systematising polarity would be that between a narrow and an 
inclusive views.
2. Narrowing language down
The biolinguist has a quick but powerful fix. Prototypically, science deals 
with problems that are well-defined and tractable, so if we want language 
origin to enjoy the status of a scientifically legitimate and respectable 
question, we must pare down the all-encompassing and thus unwieldy 
 1 Which, notably, are informative in their own right, that is independently of the “ori-
gins” question.
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notion of language to something of manageable proportions, preferably open 
to formalisation. In other words, the scientific way is to narrow language 
down to its bare computational bones, making it roughly synonymous with 
syntax2. The conceptualisation of choice is distinctly along the lines of the 
Chomskyan linguistic tradition, and the most important programmatic text 
is the influential 2002 paper by Hauser, Chomsky and Fitch (Hauser et al. 
2002). On this view, language (narrowly defined) is the “computational 
core” responsible for “discrete infinity”– the recursively combinatorial 
potential characteristic of human verbal communication. Primarily, it is 
a cognitive capacity, but in an evolutionary sense the “language faculty” 
can be understood as a genetic constitution of an organism that gives rise 
to the cognitive capacity in the course of normal ontogenetic development. 
In this evolutionary sense, FLN, or language faculty narrowly understood, 
is a phylogenetically novel, biological trait.
What is important, Hauser et al. (2002) is commonly but erroneously 
thought to define FLN as „what is both uniquely human and uniquely 
linguistic”. In fact, the definition of FLN in the 2002 text is unequivocally as 
“the computational core”, with additional hypotheses that this computational 
core may be uniquely human and may consist only of recursion. The “uniquely 
human + uniquely linguistic” definition of FLN was only proposed three 
years later in a follow-up text by the same authors (Fitch et al. 2005). The fact 
that those authors never retracted the 2002 version lead to the two definitions 
functioning side by side, resulting in a regrettable terminological mess – see 
Wacewicz (2012) for discussion.
To someone interested in staking out the scientifically legitimate territory 
by equating it with the study of FLN, this definitional move has two parts. 
Firstly, it tells us what language is: the combinatorial machinery responsible 
for generating the discrete and hierarchically structured infinity of human 
linguistic expression, the computational core that is relatively tangible and 
formalizable. The biolinguistics formalisation almost obligatorily refers to 
the apparatus of the Minimalist Programme, leading critics to suspect “that 
‘biolinguistics’ may turn out to be merely a more scientific-sounding term for 
generative minimalism” (Bickerton 2014: 74).
 2 Cf. e.g. Bolhuis, Tattersall, Chomsky and Berwick (2014): “In our view, for the pur-
poses of scientific understanding, language should be understood as a particular computa-
tional cognitive system, implemented neurally, that cannot be equated with an excessively 
expansive notion of <language as communication>.” “In place of a complex rule system or 
accounts grounded on general notions of <culture> or <communication,> it appears that hu-
man language syntax can be defined in an extremely simple way that makes conventional 
evolutionary explanations much simpler.”
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But equally if not more important is the negative proposal: what 
language is not. Such a stance generates a sizeable list of “FLB” capacities 
(extended working memory, extended Theory of Mind, mental time travel 
and displaced representation, vocal imitation, cooperation with non-kin, etc.) 
and other phenomena that supposedly do not qualify into the lawful bounds; 
that is, at least not under the term of the evolution of language.
Not surprisingly, this negative stance is well reflected in the criticism 
of the mainstream language evolution research, to which the “narrow” 
(“biolinguistics”) camp is committed. As a particularly telling example, 
Hauser, Chomsky, Lewontin and others (Hauser et al. 2014) posit that:
“(1) studies of nonhuman animals provide virtually no relevant 
parallels to human linguistic communication, and none to 
the underlying biological capacity; (2) the fossil and archaeological 
evidence does not inform our understanding of the computations and 
representations of our earliest ancestors… (3) our understanding 
of the genetics of language is so impoverished that there is little 
hope of connecting genes to linguistic processes any time soon; 
(4) all modeling attempts have made unfounded assumptions, and 
have provided no empirical tests, thus leaving any insights into 
language’s origins unverifiable.3”
Many of the problems highlighted by the recent statements from 
the Chomskyan camp (Hauser et al. 2014; Bolhuis et al. 2014) seem to 
be, in one way or another, a throwback to the influential text by Richard 
Lewontin (1998), “The evolution of cognition: Questions we will never 
answer”. Over a decade ago, Lewontin formulated a sceptical manifesto, 
pointing to numerous weaknesses in the chain of inferences from available 
evidence to adaptive (selection-based) accounts of the evolutionary 
emergence of particular cognitive traits. The reservations included poor 
definition of most cognitive traits, poor mapping to the biological (neuronal, 
genetic) correlates, their loose correspondence to the criteria for natural 
selection (such as heritability or measurable fitness advantage), and lack 
of direct evidence for function; plus scant fossil evidence and limited and 
partly inadequate comparative evidence. Symptomatically, a rhetorical 
 3 This general sentiment is probably best summarized in Noam Chomsky’s words 
at a UCL seminar, 10 October 2011: “There is a field called evolution of language, which 
has a burgeoning literature, most of which in my view is total nonsense.” (see e.g. http:// 
linguistlist.org/issues/22/22-4631.html or http://www.evolutionarylinguistics.org/home/ 
chomsky-on-language-evolution for reference)
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question that he asks near the end of the text is “Why is anyone interested 
in the evolution of human cognition?”
But this sceptical attitude, if treated seriously, could write off a majority 
of sciences whose inferences go beyond strict formalisation. In 2014, 
the genetic and fossil evidence is much richer, including well established 
evidence of fire domestication from at least 700 kya (e.g. Roebroeks and Villa 
2011), contra Lewontin’s (1998: 124) estimate of 100 kya, and comparative 
evidence is unimaginably more complete than the 1998 state of art. As to 
the definitions and operationalization of cognitive traits, this pertains equally 
well to any other cognitive science, but if anything, it is scientific theory that 
has a duty to track everyday meaning rather than vice versa. Scientific theory 
has every right to coin new technical terms but not to reach out to natural 
language to tamper with and impose on its established use, precisely what 
the syntactocentric theory is trying to do with “language”. Finally, the “why 
bother” question is just as relevant to the studies in great many other fields 
of basic research, so it cannot be used as an argument, unless we are prepared 
to let go of such disciplines as history or palaeontology.
3. The broad way – language evolution as an expanding field
Unsurprisingly, the “narrow”, or biolinguistic, perspective as outlined above, 
is now a minority position in the field. This is related to its major drawback: 
outside of a narrowly defined perspective, this restrictive notion of language 
is simply not particularly interesting. Put differently, even a relatively 
complete answer about the emergence of FLN would hardly serve as 
a satisfactory explanation of the language origins problem in the form that 
is interesting to most people. When the question of the origin of language 
is posed as one of the foundational human questions, the notion of language 
there is definitely not the narrow sense appropriated by a syntactician. 
Features or phenomena such as common ground and online coordination, 
intersubjectivity, collective intentionality, massively cooperative exchange 
of information, mimetic communication, and multimodal proto-sign, 
may not be narrowly linguistic but are certainly preconditions for verbal 
communication, and are definitely the kinds of things about whose origins 
we would like to know. It is not clear what cognitive gains are supposed 
to result calling syntax “language” and ignoring the remaining aspects 
of human verbal communication (rather than, for example, studying 
the emergence of syntax and the emergence of language as parallel but 
interrelated projects).
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Importantly, however, the “broad” view is getting broader. Insisting on 
the lexicon or aspects of phonetics and phonology as inalienably linguistic 
(and possibly unique to humans), as Pinker and Jackendoff (2005) did, is just 
a first step. Capacities that are inherently linguistic do not stop at syntax 
and its semantic/intentional and sensorimotor interfaces. Pragmatics is one 
example. Although – for reasons mostly related to theoretical prejudice – 
until recently it was neglected in the origins context4, a growing number 
of authors turn our attention to the basic fact that understanding of human 
communication rests on a rich pragmatic scaffolding (Scott-Phillips 2014, 
Adornetti and Ferretti, 2014 [this volume]). Linguistic politeness, an area 
that the standard view would see as totally peripheral, is also calling for 
attention from a naturalistic, evolutionary perspective (Wacewicz et al., 2014 
[this volume]).
Going beyond FLN does not mean simply adding more individual-
level capacities, but something more fundamental: stepping outside a single 
person’s mind and body to acknowledging language as a super-individual 
phenomenon. What Chomsky would call “E-language” may be external, but 
not epiphenomenal. There is a growing conviction, for example, that cultural 
evolution (e.g. Kirby et al. 2008) is not something second-order, kicking 
in only after we have biologically evolved (to use Arbib’s [2006] term) 
a “language-ready brain”; rather, language itself, as much as an individual 
capacity, is a cultural selection niche.
All of this is now being complemented with a move in the other direction. 
So far, language evolution accounts have benefitted enormously from 
a wealth of data on animal communication and cognition from comparative 
biologists and psychologists. But now, specifically linguistic techniques 
and methodologies are being deployed to analyze animal communication 
(and cognition). Examples include an application of Wierzbicka’s Natural 
Semantic Metalanguage to the study of conceptual repertoires in chimpanzees 
(Wierzbicka 2014: 156–182), examination of patterns of turn-taking 
in monkey vocalisations (Takahashi et al. 2013), semantic-pragmatic 
analysis of roots and affixes in Campbell’s monkey’s alarm calls (Schlenker 
et al., in press), and the general controversy regarding the applicability 
of a linguistic-morphological analysis to monkey calls (cf. Ouattara et al. 
2009, Barceló-Coblijn and Gomila 2012).
 4 Scott-Phillips (2014) observes that The Oxford Handbook of Language Evolution 
(ed. Gibson and Tallerman 2011) lists 8 pages under “pragmatics”, compared to 213 for “syn-
tax”.
11From the narrow to the broad. Multiple perspectives on language evolution
4. Multiple perspectives on language origins
The present issue of Theoria et Historia Scientiarum is comprised of texts 
which – both individually and as a collective – unambiguously vote in favour 
of the latter approach. This is particularly visible in the first part of the volume, 
where each of the papers supports the inclusive perspective on language 
evolution directly, by making a case for the relevance of a particular linguistic 
aspect, phenomenon, or methodology. Michael Pleyer and James Winters 
(2014) put forward a case for a closer integration of Cognitive Linguistics into 
language evolution research, and Maciej Pokornowski (2014), in turn, calls 
for a closer rapprochement between language evolution and data science, 
specifically big text data. Ines Adornetti and Francesco Ferretti (2014) advance 
a pragmatic, action-oriented account of language emergence which takes into 
consideration the embodiment and embeddedness of human communication. 
Finally Sławomir Wacewicz et al. (2014) show the phenomenon of linguistic 
politeness, a neglected one in language evolution research, to clearly belong 
into the realm of naturalistic, evolutionary study.
The “inclusive” line continues in the second part of the volume, with 
the text by Daniela Lenti-Boero (2014), who demonstrates how early infant 
vocalization can be useful in informing research on the origins of speech. 
Speech is also the topic of Magdalena Igras et al. (2014), who propose 
a new approach to using phoneme inventories for tracing back language 
phylogenies. Till  Nikolaus von  Heiseler (2014) and Joel Parthemore (2014) 
both present new hypotheses: the former on the role of storytelling in language 
evolution, the latter on protoconcepts, onto- and phylogenetically basic units 
of prelinguistic but conceptual thought. The volume is concluded with two 
reviews – by Agnieszka Dębska (2014) and by Sławomir Wacewicz (2014) 
– both of books that explicitly refer to the social context and social origin 
of human communication.
4.1. New directions
Pleyer and Winters (2014) put forward the point that “we can gain 
important insights on the evolution of language and cognition by integrating 
evolutionary linguistics and the framework of Cognitive Linguistics [(CL)]”. 
Their discussion focuses on two trends in CL: usage-based approaches, 
which view language structures as arising through abstraction from 
individual communicative events (Bybee 2010; Ellis 2013), and Construction 
Grammar with its notion of language as “a structured inventory or network 
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of constructions […] defined as form-meaning pairings with varying degrees 
of schematicity […]” (Goldberg 2006, Hilpert 2014). When interpreted 
as complex adaptive systems (Beckner et al. 2009: 2), the description 
of linguistic process afforded by usage-based approaches and Construction 
Grammar can, according to Pleyer and Winters, help understand the evolution 
of language in the three scales identified by Kirby (2012, mentioned earlier 
in Kirby and Hurford 2002) – the ontogenetic timescale of individuals 
acquiring language, the glossogenetic timescale of historical language change 
and the phylogenetic timescale of the evolution of the species. In drafting 
their proposal for the synthesis of CL and evolutionary linguistics, the authors 
identify the common interest of the two fields in “the cognitive machinery […] 
of language and use”, which helps account for the change of language systems 
and, if studied with regard to its biological prerequisites, can – as Pleyer and 
Winters hope – shed light on how language emerged in the first place. 
In a similar vein, Pokornowski (2014) argues for a “closer interaction 
between data science and evolutionary linguistics”. He observes that 
the emerging field of Big Data has not yet benefitted from the interest 
of evolutionarily inclined linguists, and that the vast and quickly growing 
resources of digitalised language are becoming an important but relatively 
unexplored type of material for testing evolutionary hypotheses. Pokornowski 
then turns to Twitter as a paragon example of a massive open-access body 
of authentic language dataripe for investigation, including evolutionarily-
inspired investigation. His claim is substantiated by putting forward 
a model, inspired by the Iterated Learning tradition, for studying the quasi-
evolutionary changes at the level of topic-specific sublanguages on Twitter, 
with possibilities for extension to other social media sites. 
Also in line with a broad and inclusive perspective on the study of language 
origins, Adornetti and Ferretti (2014) speak out against narrow views on 
language, such as the Chomskyan syntactocentric tradition or the code 
model. These authors underscore the grounding of language in context: to 
human users, language is not an abstract, disembodied processing machine, 
but a tool for interaction of real, flesh-and-blood agents, which they use 
in a specific external environment to achieve pragmatic communicative 
success. On Adornetti and Ferretti’s analysis, embracing a less abstract and 
more action-oriented and embedded account of language goes hand in hand 
with arguments for the gestural rather than vocal origin of human symbolic 
communication. Their claims are fleshed out with references to rich empirical 
work on the mirror system in primates.
Wacewicz, Żywiczyński and McCrohon (2014) turn their attention to 
linguistic politeness, a phenomenon almost non-existent in evolutionary-
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linguistic literature. They point to the fact that linguistic politeness acts as 
an interface between language and the “core questions of human ethology 
and human behavioural ecology”, such as normativity, cooperation and 
group hierarchy. While they do take note of the substantial difficulties 
in investigating politeness – for example, problems with an unambiguous 
definition, operationalization and measuring of politeness, and respecting 
the vast intercultural differences – they conclude that linguistic politeness 
deserves a place on a naturalistically oriented research agenda. Among 
the most interesting questions Wacewicz et al. point to is that of the 
evolutionary stability of politeness, which seems to be a consistently 
beneficial signal despite being “cheap” and manipulable.
4.2. New solutions
Lenti Boero proposes how arguments from developmental psychology, 
specifically those that relate to human vocal behaviours, can inform 
the research on early, protolinguistic, beginnings of language. Careful to 
avoid the recapitulationist fallacy, Lenti Boero examines the developmental 
pathway of human infants – from the earliest stage characterized by crying 
through musibabling (her own concept referring to infants’ engagement 
in protophonic productions) until the onset of the universal speech perception 
at the age of six months – in search for the vocal precursors of language. 
In doing so, she appeals to the arguments both from parental selection 
(Locke 2006) and sexual selection (as envisaged by Darwin 1871 and later 
by Mithen 2006, 2009). Her paper also contains an interesting discussion 
on vocal mimicry and the viability of onomatopoeic protolanguage in the 
light of neurocognitive research (Hashimoto et al. 2006).
The paper by Igras et al. (2014) deals with measuring phonemic 
inventories in languages and the possibilities of applying this knowledge 
to inform research on language phylogenies. This approach was pioneered 
by Atkinson (2011), who suggested that the notion of founder effect 
from population genetics could be applied to tracing back migrations 
of populations of language users across considerable time scales. Igras 
et al. compiled a database with audio material from over 3500 languages, 
relying mostly on the material from the Global Recording Network but 
complemented with other sources. They have been developing methods 
of automated segmentation of this data into phonemes and computing 
distances between languages; despite initial equivocal results, they are 
aiming to bring this methodology to bear on the linguistic serial founder 
debate.
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Von Heiseler’s starting point is the idea of atypically fast evolution 
in the hominin line, with recent research indicating that the development 
of cognitive abilities in our ancestors was accelerated about 16 times 
compared to other primates. This suggests a discontinuity in the evolutionary 
process comparable to the emergence of sexual reproduction or the cell 
nucleus: a major transition in evolution. In this new framework, he proposes 
the following hypothesis: a completely new system developed, one that 
created its own elements in the form of human beings, language, and culture. 
This new evolutionary system consists of two feedback loops connected with 
a backchannel between them, and the content of this backchannel is displaced 
action encoded in narration. Although it is difficult to do justice here to von 
Heiseler’s complex proposal, its core is that not only the human brain and 
language but also most of the unique human faculties (including advanced 
theory of mind and episodic memory) are adapted almost exclusively to 
developing the functioning of the backchannel (narration) at a super-fast 
evolutionary pace. Von Heiseler’s account is undoubtedly speculative and 
controversial, but even if his paper turns on several risky assumptions, it 
contains a number of daring and innovative proposals.
Parthemore (2014) considers the problem of primacy between language-
like communication (which apparently relies on concepts) and conceptual 
thought (which on some influential accounts derives from language). 
Parthemore rejects the radical positions of Fodor’s nativism and McDowell’s 
conceptualism to propose his own moderately nativistic Protoconcept 
Hypothesis, on which human cognition comes innately equipped with a small 
set of protoconceptual categories, which then give rise to progressively 
more complex conceptual repertoires. In short, we are innately biased to 
experience and interact with the world in some ways and not in others, 
beyond what our embodiment contributes. Basic protoconcepts correspond 
to some of the most superordinate categories organizing our experience, 
such as proto-objects, proto-happenings, and proto-properties (in English 
mapping to the grammatical categories of nouns, verbs, and adjectives and 
adverbs). Complementing them with several quasi-logical operators would 
yield “a minimally structured logic both far simpler and at the same time far 
more expressively powerful than existing formal logics” – a system capable 
of grounding protolanguage.
4.3. The social dimension
Increasingly many recent publications on language origins refer to the social 
perspective (e.g. Scott-Phillips 2014, Dunbar et al. [ed] 2014). Dębska 
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(2014) reviews one of them, The Evolution of Social Communication 
in Primates (ed. Pina and Gontier 2014). Rather than offering a point-by-
point report on the book, Dębska identifies and developssome of the threads 
in the book that “define the key points of the current debate on language 
evolution”, such as the flexibility vocalisation in apes or the extent of their 
Theory-of-Mind capacities. Dębska’s specific focus is on the surprisingly 
complex communicative behaviour that pointing turns out to be. She 
discusses the differences of perspective between contributors to the volume, 
mirroring those in the field at large, as to whether (untrained) chimpanzees 
and other apes are capable of declarative pointing or of understanding human 
declarative pointing. Dębska concludes that in this subfield of communication 
theory “there is a need to develop at least minimal empirical criteria for basic 
concepts”.
Finally, Wacewicz (2014) reviews The social origins of language 
(ed. Dor, Knight and Lewis 2014), which in his view “aspires […] to 
the role of an important programmatic statement”. After contemplating 
the possible definitions of “the social”, he turns to the major threads of the 
book: the problem of honest, cooperative signalling in humans, of cultural 
evolution, and of the multifaceted nature of language. This last point 
is particularly important. Wacewicz fully endorses the inclusive outlook 
on the study of language (origins), which is represented in the reviewed 
volume and is best captured in a quote from the introduction by the editors 
(Dor, Knight and Lewis 2014: 2): “more and more of what we learn about 
language remains confined to specialized professional circles. However, to 
understand the origin of language requires a move in the opposite direction–a 
large-scale, collective interdisciplinary effort at theoretical synthesis. [...] 
Everything counts.”
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